argument thus: Practitioners should symbolically represent the persons whom they serve as consumers. The symbolic idea (metaphor) of consumer can infuse practice with the directive to respect the autonomy of those who seek therapy. A consumerbased model can center service on the will of the person being served; practitioners guided by this model wiJJ collaborate and thus "ensure that the consumer is autonomous in establishing treatment plans and goals" (p. 900).
Before turning to Bowen's (1996) argument, I must speak to her semantics. The personal agency that she proposed is not well conveyed by the idea of consumer-one who buys from another who produces. Collaboration, defined as "working together" (Webster's New World Dictionary, 1994) , seems better served by other metaphors. When Reed (1984) discussed the utility of models for practice, she noted the drawback of "inaccurate representation" (p. 4) in which the symbol chosen does not match what it aims to symbolize. I see this lack of match in the suggestion that we adopt a model on the basis of an idea of persons whom we serve as consumers; consumer conveys an agency that falls short of coJJaboration. Bowen (1996) equated a consumerbased model with client-centered practice; I do nor. The terms client and patientshare more similarity in meaning than either does with the term consumer. The term client, commonly defined as a "person dependent on another, as for protection or patronage ... a person served by a social agency," derives from a root (clinere) that means to lean on another. The term patient, a "person receiving care or treatment," comes from the root word for suffering (patz) (Webste1 ''s New World Dictionary, 1994) . Symbolically, patients and clients evoke from most a disposition to care; consumers do nor. Bowen's (1996) equation of c1ient-centered service and consumer-based model makes her argument less clear. In a concept paper published in 1995, the profession endorsed client-centered service and deemed collaborative actions important, stating:
The American Occuparional Therapy Association (AOTA) asserrs that service delivery is client centered and interaCtive in nature, and that it must be consistent wirh occupational therapy's philosophical base (AOTA, 1979) , core values and beliefs (AOTA, 1993a), principles of theory and practice, and code of ethics (AOTA, 1994a) . (AOTA, 1995 (AOTA, , p. 1029 If Bowen gave the terms client-centered and consumer-based the same meaning, I
wonder what further support she sought?
My issue is more than semantics. One problem that we have had in disregarding personal agency stems in part from our having represented persons as patients or clients while practicing within medical or civil agency models. Whenever we ignore the autonomy of "patients who suffer" or "clients who ster:r New World Dictionary, 1994) . Because Bowen (1996) supported collaboration as a fearure of a consumerbased model, I shall press paSt semantics and rurn ro her argumem witn these queStions: (a) Does a consumer-based model support collaborative aCtions) (b) Does our profession's ethos do so) (c) \Vhat help can we gain from a consumer-based model? My questions do not argue against collaboration; they enaCt Bowen's hope: "A necessalY firSt step is a thorough discussion of the model and itS implications on praCtice" (p.901).
An analogy may set my rone. If my nephew were to ask what I thought of his dressing like a favored jazz musician, I could readily respond after seeing rhe man's style. If my nephew were ro ask what I thought of his adopting the jazz musician as his model, I would have him tell me more. From the phrase "adopt as a model," I would gather that he hoped ro emulate the saliem traits of the musician and perhaps the man. This second question would be more serious and our discussion more eXtended; my nephew would be asking me abOUt how he should be. Bowen's (1996) quesrion is similar; she speaks ro the charaCter of occupational therapy when she asks us to adopt a consumer-based model. To name the persons who seek our therapy consumers is to frame a response we must consider.
The Ethos of Consumerism: An Impoverishment of Persons Elsewhere I have argued rhat good business praCtices are parr of good care (Peloquin, 1996 Peters and Waterman (1982) discussed the act of "sraying close ro the customer" (p. 157):
In observing the excellenr companies, and specifically the way rhey interact with cusromets, what we found most striking was the consistem presence of obSfj~,iol1. This characteristically occurred as a seemingly unjustifiable overcommitment ro some form of quality, reliability, or service. (p.
i57)
A consumer-based model can prompt good quality, reliability, and service. But intent is important here because I speak of ethos. Peters and \Vaterman shared this rationaJe for staying dose: "Service, qualiry, and reliabiliry are strategies aimed at loyalty and long-term revenue srream growth" (p. 157). If given voice, the erhos prompting the aCt would say, "Stay close to the consumer because of the sale."
My concern should be growing dear. Consumer-based aCtions flow from an ethos of profit, mainly that of the producer: "All business success rests on something labeled a sale, which at leaSt momentarily weds company and custOmer" (Peters & Waterman, 1982, p. 155) . Business experts nOte that if the aim of customer satisfaction is so obvious as ro nOt need discussion, "despite all the lip service given to the market orien tation ... the customer is either ignored or considered a bloody nuisance" (Peters & Waterman, 1982, p. 156) .
Staying close to the custOmer is a slippery task. As a consumer, I have often been discounred. A1rhough a small woman, I buy products designed for larger persons. Rarely have I been invited to collaboratewirh the producers of goods and services despite an assertive business manner (developed in self-defense). I cannor even say rhat I always choose to buy what I do. Automobile air bags, for example, designed and reSted on 70-kilogram men and made mandatory features on my car-for the sake of safety-were only larely deemed life-rhreatening to persons my size. Collaborative experiences seem reserved for a discrete group whose high income (and thus pOtential to give real profit) allows custom-made production and unlimited choice. The slogan "buyer beware" conveys the lesser Status thar spawned advocacy groups and the Consumer Bill of Righ tS.
In health care delivery, consumerism is an issue. I have examined hundreds of stories of health care gone awry, hoping to learn more about the forces that shape what patients call depersonalization (Peloquin, 1993a) . In most inStances, some diminished regard for persons (with rhoughts and will, feelings and courage, knowledge and understanding, energy and experiences) seemed problematic. Three situations fearured foremost in health care fiascoes. The firSt was when practirioners engaged in a rational fixing of a heal th care problem, while disregarding a person's sense of being ill. The second was when practitioners relied overly much on method or protocol, while disregarding a person's will. The third was when praCtitioners seemed driven by efficiency and profit. In each instance, caregivers, including occupational therapiStS, disregarded some vital parr of persons (Peloquin, 1993b) .
From many such stories, I learned the ethos of a consumer-based model:
Within a business orientation to health care, knowledge takes coin value, cure becomes a high-priced commodity, and ill persons are rransformed into buyers. Success and solvency turn into treatment goals, producrivity and efficiency intO the means to achieve them. In this scheme, more accrues from procedures rhar cure than from manners that care. (Peloquin, 1993h, p. 
An Ethos Already in Place: For the Sake of Persons
The ethos of occupational therapy, articulated in the profession's literature and guiding documents, supports collaboration for the sake of persons and their occupational natures. The founders of the Society for the Promotion of Occupational Therapy established its personal character. Speaking to a group of graduating students, Kidner (1929) noted the profession's ethos and the effects of losmg 1r:
May you reaJize in increasing measure the value of certain spirirual things which are the real making of life, bUt which we caJi by many common names. Kindness, humanity, decency, honor, good faith-to give these up under any circumstances whatever would be a loss greater than any defeat, or even death itself. (p. 385) Within The Healing Heart, a biography of Ora Ruggles who was a reconstruction aide during World War I and therapist through the 1950s, we see how this ethos shaped the actions that characterized occupational therapy (Carlova & Ruggles, 1946) . Ruggles was disposed to be a covenanted parmer-a friend-to her patients (Peloquin, 1993a (Peloquin, , 1993b . With occupation and its analysis, she enaCted empathy in its fullness, nor JUSt as a cognitive grasp of patients' siruations, but as an affective responsivity to their wams and needs (Peloquin, 1995) . The tide of Ruggles's biography refers to her discovery: "Ie is not enough to give a patient something to do with his [or her] hands. You must reach for the heart as well as the hands. It's the heart that really does the healing" (Carlova & Ruggles, 1946, p. 69) . Commonly associared with soul, heart includes a person's passions, energy, courage, and will (Webster's New World Dictionary, 1994) .
The ethos of a service that reaches for (and with) the heart fills the first line of the Pledge and Creedfor Occupational Therapists submitted by the Boston School of Occupational Therapy and adopted by the Association in 1926: "Reverendy and eamesrly do I pledge my whole-hearted service" (as cired in Welles, 1976, p. 45) . There is no stronger endorsement of collaboration with orhers than the concept of reaching for their hearts.
The story of Ruggles is not singular. Within the professional literature is a hisrory of therapistS striving to practice the science as well as the art, to ensure that the three agents of service-the person who seeks therapy, the occupation, the therapist-come together to make therapy happen (Peloquin, 1989 (Peloquin, , 1990 (Peloquin, , 1994 (Peloquin, ,1995 . Within phenomenological narratives and fictional creations, one finds therapists engaged in competent functions alongside caring actions, somerimes falling short of a balance to seem either paternalistic or procedural bur as often emerging as covenanted parmers, friends, and collaborators (Peloquin, 1990 (Peloquin, , 1993a . These Janer emerge as persons who know what to do while understanding how to be, who tap the courage and will of Others, and who see in each relationship a chance to make real and meaningful connections.
If these Stories teU the individual strivings of practitioners, they also show our collective aims (Peloquin, 1990 (Peloquin, , 1993b . The profession's grasp of its ethos is clear; supporr has come through events and documents. For example, at a time when therapists seemed skewed toward procedural success, professional leaders issued this call: A climate of caring is vital and collaboration with patients essential (Baum, 1980; Yerxa, 1980) . The code of ethics supportS therapeutic acrions, including collaboration for the sake of personal beneficence, autonomy, privacy, confidentiality, duty, justice, fidelity, and veracity (AOTA, 1994) . The profession's newly developed document on core values and attitudes charges therapists to practice the ethos: the values of altruism, equality, freedom, justice, dignity, truth, and prudence (AOTA,1993) .
The concept paper mentioned at the start of this discussion stated that "service delivery involves rhe occupational rherapy pracritioner and client in a collaborative process of working together to design and implement services" (AOTA, 1995 (AOTA, , p. 1029 . This theme of aCtively working together (co-laboring) weaves so solidly through the profession's literature that it is a mandate. We are remiss, as Bowen (1996) suggested, in asking so litrle about how well we followir.
Collaboration: Enacting the Profession's Ethos
If the call to collaborate is clear, the need to muster energy for that action is real. A practitioner who hopes to enact our ethos within contexts that toUt other values must find support from many sources. For example, concerned years ago about a growing apathy among one group of patients, I worked to help them see the possibilities of occupation (Peloquin, 1983) . I found support for this acrion in Bloomer's (1978) discussion of the right of "the consumer of therapy" (p. 621) to be informed. I argued that as service providers, we must share our knowledge and give choices accorded in the Consumer Bill of Rights (Bloomer, 1978) .
Years later, I reviewed a sampling of the occupational therapy literature for evidence of therapists collaborating with patients (Peloquin, 1988) . When Bowen did so more recenrly, she concluded that the "literature in the United States provides Etrle evidence of therapist-consumer collaborarion in treatment planning" (Bowen, 1996, p. 900) . Because I had thought the term collaboration new in therapeuric circles, I searched for evidence of the process described as active participarion and interacrion, and I found ir.
Comments such as those from Edgerton (1947 ), McNary (1947 , and Wade (1947) supported the patient's acrive participarion in shaping the rreatment plan. These included a call for such involvement even among patients whose impairments might rhwart the process. I found more evidence in later literarure, such as rhe work of Fine and Schwimmer (1986) (Peloquin, 1988, p. 777).
My naivete had given way to respect for our ethos.
Practitioners can gain suPPOrt from contemporary trends (as I did from the Consumer Bill of Rights). New models and currenr trends can rouse dormanr sensibilities and restore energy for enduring tasks. Bowen's (1996) inquiry into the merits of adopting a consumerbased model can hone our commirment to collaborare. I r ought not, however, dull our vision of person-centered care.
Conclusion
The question that prompted this discussion was whether we should adopt a consumer-based model of service delivery. I believe that we should nor. The prompt to "stay dose to the customer" is fine, and ir may well move us to collaborate in ways that Bowen (J 996) proposed. But the consumer-based model differs from rhe prompt. We must be wary of adopting a model that grounds collaboration on a pinched ethos of staying close for the sake of praHL The richer ethos of occupational therapy-that we reach for heans--ought not be traded.
I hope that we will each answer affirmatively Bowen's (996) more fundamenral question about whether we should collaborate with those whom we serve. We have a longstanding caB to do so for the sake of persons and their occupational natures. On occasion, we may renew our energy for the task by citing contemporary trends and models that prompt good actions. But newer is not always better. And cojjaboration is not the core of consumerism. The values that drive this model can lead to actions not in character with occupational therapy.
We can take heart for cojjaborating from a longsranding ethos rhat disposes us to do so: To treat persons with kindness, humaniry, decency, honor, and good fairh. A consumer-based model can give no such heart. To represent
The American Journal ofOccupational Therapy those who seek our service as consumers is to risk a "loss greater than any defeat" (Kidner, 1929, p. 385) . Occupational therapy would languish if its ethosregard for persons-were traded for deference to their claims as consumers .....
